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A B S T R A C T   
This paper analyses two differing approaches to the improvement of local bus services, using the analytical lens 
of formal and informal institutions. Both formal and informal institutions govern the behaviour of authorities and 
operators, but they do it in different ways and they have advantages and disadvantages. In so doing we seek to 
understand both how the informal institutional approach (e.g. voluntary partnership working) can be used 
effectively, but also to assess its limits; and to understand why a formal institutional approach (e.g. franchising), 
in spite of its strong underlying basis in law, may nonetheless not always function. Through doing so, this paper 
contributes to the current understanding of how to handle the unintended consequences of a deregulated market 
through the different (formal and informal) ways available.   
1. Introduction 
Great Britain outside London is one of the few developed economies 
to have a fully deregulated local bus industry (Van de Velde, 2003), 
something that was introduced in 1986 by the then Conservative gov-
ernment with the stated aims of improving quality and choice and 
driving down price by stimulating on-road competition between private 
operators (Gwilliam, 2008). Many authors have since analysed some of 
the unintended consequences of this deregulated market (e.g. White, 
2010; Preston and Almutairi, 2013; Cowie, 2014), while governments 
since 2000, mindful of these consequences, have enacted new legislation 
that has given local (passenger) transport authorities ((P)TAs) optional 
powers to give the public sector greater influence over the bus industry 
in their area. These range from relatively “light touch” measures such as 
coordination of information provision (McTigue et al., 2020), through 
various forms of partnership working between authorities and opera-
tors, to area-wide franchising and an effective end to the deregulated 
market in an area. The use of this latter power, although in existence 
since 2000, has only been so far attempted by one PTA, a case study 
which is one of the two in this paper, while the other is a study of 
partnership working. The institutional framework applied in this paper 
treats the franchising model as the creation of a formal institution and 
the partnership model as an informal institution. 
The objective of the paper is to analyse two differing approaches to 
the improvement of local bus services, using the analytical lens of formal 
(governance established in law) and informal (governance not estab-
lished in law) institutions (North, 1991; Hrelja et al., 2018). The key 
research question is why passenger transport authorities choose one of 
these models versus the other. 
Both formal and informal institutions govern the behaviour of au-
thorities and operators but they do it in different ways and they have 
advantages and disadvantages. In the paper we seek to understand both 
how the informal institutional approach (e.g. voluntary partnership 
working) can be used effectively, but also to assess its limits; and to 
understand why a formal institutional approach (e.g. franchising), in 
spite of its strong underlying basis in law, may nonetheless not always 
function. Through doing so, this paper contributes to the current un-
derstanding of how to handle the unintended consequences of a 
deregulated market through the different (formal and informal) ways 
available. 
The paper first outlines the recent history and current state of the bus 
market in Britain outside London in terms of industry structure, 
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passenger numbers and financial viability. It then presents the analytical 
framework of informal and formal institutions, before going on to 
explain the methodology used. The two case studies are then described 
before being discussed together in relation to the analytical framework, 
and conclusions drawn. 
2. Literature review 
2.1. Buses and their regulation in Britain outside London 
Buses are the most frequently used and most accessible mode of 
public transport in Great Britain. They are essential for delivering eco-
nomic, social and health benefits. In particular, bus services enable 
people to get from A to B and provide access to important services such 
as work, health and education. In some instances, bus services are the 
only other available mode of transport for those without car ownership. 
Bus networks are also estimated to generate several billions in economic 
benefits by providing “access to opportunities, reducing pollution and ac-
cidents and improving productivity” (Urban Transport Group UTG, 2016). 
However, the latest statistics released by Transport Scotland (2019), 
the Welsh Government (2019) and the UK DfT (2019) show that there 
has been a steady decline in bus vehicle mileage operated across Great 
Britain (outside of London) in recent years. In Scotland, the annual 
vehicle mileage operated by scheduled local bus services fell in six of the 
last ten years (Transport Scotland, 2019), while in Wales, the miles 
operated fell by 20% since 2007–08. According to the Welsh Govern-
ment (2019), this decrease is due primarily to a decrease of 46% in local 
authority supported mileage. Furthermore, in England outside London, 
local bus mileage operated has decreased by 13.8% since 2004/05. 
Similar to the situation in Wales, this decrease is due to a 50% reduction 
in local authority supported mileage since it reached its highest ever 
level as a proportion of total bus vehicle mileage operated, in 2009/10 
(DfT, 2019). 
Similar to bus mileage, there has also been a decline in bus patronage 
which has a damaging effect on the bus network. Further statistics 
released by Transport Scotland (2019), the Welsh Government (2019) 
and the UK DfT (2019) show that this has occurred across Great Britain 
(outside of London) with passenger numbers following a continuous 
downward trend since the peak of 2.41 billion passenger journeys in 
2008/09. Fig. 1 summarises this and shows clearly that bus usage in 
London has risen up until recent years, while there has been a gradual 
decline in bus usage in England outside London, and in Scotland and 
Wales. 
A decrease in bus patronage and bus mileage has a damaging effect 
on the delivery of bus services across the UK – instead of a virtuous circle 
of increased passenger numbers stimulating enhanced service levels, the 
opposite happens, and network coverage and service frequency contract, 
and often service quality, as operators seek to cut costs to remain prof-
itable. As well as having a negative impact on economic, social and 
health benefits, quality of life suffers due to a lack of physical access to 
jobs, health, education and other amenities (Banister, 2000). 
Increasing wealth and car ownership are key drivers of reduced bus 
use and therefore some of the problems outlined above (Holmgren, 
2020). However, many local transport authorities are seeking to reverse 
the decline in bus services and use in order to guarantee access to jobs 
and services for those with no car, and also to deal with problems of 
congestion and pollution, especially in urban areas (see for example 
Greater Manchester’s Transport Strategy (TfGM, 2018)). Since they 
cannot directly influence wealth and car ownership, instead some of 
these transport authorities have attempted to improve the competi-
tiveness of bus services with car by using a variety of statutory and 
non-statutory tools to promote closer working between them and bus 
operators, and/or to give themselves as public sector bodies greater 
control over the actions of those operators. These tools and the way that 
they have developed are reviewed in some detail in Rye and Wretstrand 
(2014), so a detailed description is not provided here, but the two that 
are of key relevance to this paper – because the two case studies fall into 
these categories - are as follows:  
⋅ The Quality Contract: re-regulation of the services in an area under 
public sector control, with operator(s) running services under con-
tract in a model similar to that in Scandinavia or London model. On- 
road competition is no longer possible in a Quality Contract. First 
enabled in the 2000 Transport Act, the powers to franchise and 
contract services were amended in the 2008 Local Transport Act and 
again in the 2017 Bus Services Act.  
⋅ The quality partnership: an agreement between PTA, operator and 
often also the local highway (roads) authority to work together to 
increase the quality of bus services in all or part of their area. This 
can be statutory, and under the 2000 Transport Act, 2008 Local 
Transport Act and 2017 Bus Services Act various forms of legally 
constituted partnership have been or are possible; however, a more 
Fig. 1. Passenger journeys (patronage) by country and groupings of region per head of population 1991–2019. 
Author’s elaboration based on DfT (2020) Bus Statistics Table BUS0103. 
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common approach has been voluntary partnership working. (This 
form of partnership should not be confused with the “trusted part-
nership” approach underlying negotiated contracts described by 
Stanley and Hensher (2008); in the partnerships that are the subject 
of this paper, the public partner cannot directly specify any element 
of the bus service.) 
An analytically important question is then why PTAs choose a 
particular approach to the improvement of local bus services and what 
the pros or cons of different approaches are. This will be analysed 
through the use of the concepts of informal and formal institutions. 
2.2. Formal and informal institutions and the role of agency 
The study of institutions derives from economics and sociology and 
over time has produced an enormous literature. For the purposes of this 
paper, we use the definition of institutions provided by North (1990: 
98): “the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic 
and social interaction.” Later authors have focused on various aspects of 
institutions, particularly their social aspects (Giddens, 1995) and the 
complex and provisional ways in which they evolve (Selznick, 1996; 
Jessop, 2001; Aoki, 2007). One of the key themes running through these 
analyses is the importance of shared beliefs in institutions as rules of the 
game. Thus to a large degree institutions are informal and social rather 
than formal. Despite this informal nature, the key players in the domain 
of institutions are organisations, which have formal structures and 
whose own structures can become institutions themselves. The distinc-
tion between institutions and organisations often cited is that of North 
(1990), for whom institutions represent the rules of the game, while 
organisations are the players, yet organisations can themselves be in-
stitutions, particularly legal and cultural organisations (Scott, 2008). A 
key issue here for the success of an institution as well as related orga-
nisations is the degree of legitimacy which derives from several elements 
such as the desirability of action, the appropriateness of the actions 
taken and powers awarded and the diversity of authorities involved and 
consistency of beliefs of the actors regarding how the institution should 
function (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
According to North (1991: 98), institutions “consist of both informal 
constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of 
conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)”. Both 
these formal and informal institutions are highly relevant to govern-
ments and public organisations, particularly when, as in the cases in this 
paper, the public authority seeks to innovate. According to González and 
Healey (2005: 2056), innovation capacity “is not just defined by formal 
laws and organizational competences, but is embedded in the dynamics 
of governance practices, with their complex interplay of formal and 
informal relations.” 
The importance of the dynamics of formal and informal institutions 
in the innovation strategies of public authorities is in line with previous 
research in the area of public transport (e.g. Hansson, 2013; Hrelja, 
2015). Previous studies provide evidence that informal and formal in-
stitutions, as two modes of governance, are in fact, highly complemen-
tary. Informal institutions may help private and public organisations 
negotiate the constraints of formal, statutory institutions when these are 
producing sub-optimal public transport (Rye and Wretstrand, 2014; 
Hrelja et al., 2017). Voluntary or “trusting” partnership working has in 
some cases been developed to deal with various types of barriers to 
delivering better public transport by building an “informal space” to 
bridge gaps in the regulatory context (Dementiev, 2016; Stanley and van 
de Velde, 2008; Hensher and Stanley, 2010). Hirschborn et al. (2020) 
applied to the case of public transport the typology of Helmke and 
Levitsky (2004) which defines the relationship between formal and 
informal institutions as complementary, accommodating, competing or 
substituting. They highlighted the role of agency and found that “agents 
have a central role in triggering institutional change over time through 
the way they engage with the properties of existing institutional 
frameworks that permit or invite specific kinds of change strategies”. 
This paper analyses the interplay between these formal and informal 
institutions and the role of agency in attempts to improve public 
transport in two English metropolitan regions. 
3. Methodology 
The case studies were selected for two principal reasons. In the case 
of the Quality Contract (formal institutional) case study in the north east 
of England, it was not possible to select another case study since this 
metropolitan region remains the only one to have gone through all 
stages of the formal quality contract approval process. Greater Man-
chester is currently (May 2020) preparing a franchising scheme under 
powers granted to it by the Bus Services Act (2017), but this is not at the 
point where the formal approval process has begun. In the case of the 
West Midlands, the region chosen as the case study of quality partner-
ship (informal institutional) processes to improve bus services, it was 
selected because it is the metropolitan region in England that has 
worked for longest and at the greatest scale (region-wide) on its quality 
partnerships. A metropolitan region was selected because its governance 
structure is almost identical to that of the north east of England; areas 
such as Nottingham or Bristol which have worked on quality partner-
ships for many years have a different governance structure. 
The empirical material in this study consists of written material 
collected and interviews carried out in 2016 and 2017. A total of some 
14 semi-structured interviews with key officers in local authorities, bus 
operators and passenger transport authorities were carried out. In 
addition, in north east England some other organisations such as pas-
senger rights’ groups and the regional chamber of commerce were 
interviewed. A list of interviewees is shown in Table 1. Written material 
was also reviewed comprising transport planning documents, business 
Table 1 
Interview participants.  
Organisation Number of 
participants 




Executive body of the 
North East 
Combined 





Bus Company – 
Stagecoach North 
East 
1 Managing Director Operator 
Executive body of the 
North East 
Combined 
Authority – NEXUS 
1 Corporate 









1 Sustainable Travel 
Manager 
Private sector but 
in this instance 
lobby group/ 
stakeholder 









1 Policy Advisor Private sector but 
in this instance 
lobby group/ 
stakeholder 
Bus Company – Go 
North East 
2 Managing Director 
and Head of 
Network Analysis 
Operator 
Tyne and Wear PTUG 2 Chair of group and 









Bus Company – 
National Express 
West Midlands 
1 Managing Director Operator 
Centro (now 
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case documents, transport plans, and agreements between operators and 
public authorities, where relevant (these are shown in the list of 
references). 
The semi-structured interviews were based on an interview guide. 
The questions asked touch mainly on the following themes: a) the 
development of proposals for quality partnerships or quality contracts 
(QPs or QCs) and the motivations for them; b) what the QCs and QPs 
included and achieved; c) reasons for what was achieved, or not; and d) 
Dynamics of the processes (Which formal and informal relations exist 
between the different actors involved? Were there conflicts of interest? 
How were conflicts handled?). An outline of the interview guide used is 
shown in Annex 1, although this formed a basis of what was asked, and 
questions were added or modified by participant and region. 
The interviews were recorded digitally, with the approval of the 
interviewees. The recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim. The 
subsequent analysis, where patterns in the data were categorized, was 
based on the verbatim transcribed material. Similarities and dissimi-
larities between the interviewees’ experiences were identified. In the 
paper, verbatim quotes from the interviews are used to illustrate the 
analysis. 
4. The informal institutional case study: developing 
partnerships in the West Midlands 
4.1. Introduction 
The West Midlands metropolitan region of England is centred on the 
City of Birmingham but includes several large towns and cities and in 
total has a population of almost 6 million people living in an area of only 
900 square km. In common with other English metropolitan regions it 
has had a passenger transport authority (PTA) to coordinate (although, 
since 1986, not in most cases to operate) public transport in the region 
and, since 2017 it has had an elected mayor in charge of the PTA and 
some other regional government functions. The PTA is called Transport 
for the West Midlands (TfWM). Most local government functions – 
including control of roads – remain, however, with one of six metro-
politan boroughs covering different parts of the area. Bus is the main 
form of public transport in the region carrying 267 million trips in 2019 
compared to 50 million by train and 7 million on the one light rail line 
(TfWM, 2019). The main bus operator is a multinational privately 
owned stock market listed company, National Express, with its local 
services in the region (which account for 90% of the total) trading under 
the brand NEX West Midlands (NEXWM). 
4.2. What does the partnership consist of? 
The partnership consists of various elements. There is a Bus Alliance, 
which is a voluntary umbrella partnership arrangement for all operators 
in the West Midlands, but with particular relevance to NEXWM as the 
largest operator, TfWM as the PTA, and the boroughs as highway (roads) 
authorities. The Bus Alliance has a Board chaired by the regional head of 
Passenger Focus (the bus consumer watchdog), with representatives of 
the bus operators, the police, and roads authorities. The Bus Alliance 
main document sets out a series of 50 actions to be carried out by the 
various parties between its publication in 2015, and 2020, as well as key 
objectives and Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) relating to ridership, 
bus passenger satisfaction and so on. These actions are not binding on 
the various parties but their adoption in a public document makes it 
more likely that they will be implemented. An example of a KPI is that to 
grow passenger numbers by 5% over the Bus Alliance period. Examples 
of actions are a commitment by NEXWM not to increase fares by more 
than inflation plus one percent each year; TfWM’s multi-operator 
multimodal smartcard scheme; and various highways schemes to give 
priority to buses. 
Complementary to the overarching Bus Alliance, there are a number 
of regular operational groups of operator, highways authority and/or 
TfWM staff to deal with, for example, information or highways issues. In 
addition, there are several statutory partnerships that are legally binding 
on operators, made by the PTA under the relevant legislation at the time. 
These cover small areas, particularly city centres, and stipulate the 
minimum quality and emissions standard of vehicles that can run ser-
vices in these areas, the allocation of stop space, and “softer” issues such 
as cleanliness and driver behaviour. Nonetheless, the informal nature of 
the overall partnership is recognized and this was put well by the bus 
operator representative: 
There’s lots of levers they have, none of it written down - individu-
ally written down but none of it claiming this is the partnership and here 
are the penalties, it’s not a Service Level Agreement (SLA). It’s not a rail 
franchise that goes if you don’t deliver in 62 per cent X, Y, Z, we’ll cost 
you Y, it’s a sort of unwritten, well, we’ll be good guys and you be good 
guys. 
4.3. Where did the proposal come from? How did it develop? 
According to the interviewees, there has been partnership working to 
improve bus services in the West Midlands since at least 2000, but this 
started to become organized and formalized around 2008, for several 
reasons:  
⋅ The older personalities in both the public and private sectors who 
had “been around since before deregulation [1986]” began to be 
replaced by newer staff whose attitude towards partnership working 
was more positive. As one interviewee said: “I guess it was personnel 
changes that - it was almost the previous generation started it and then the 
current generation took it to a new level and I think that was on both 
sides”.  
⋅ To the operators it became more obvious that partnership working 
was needed to grow passenger numbers, to deliver for example bus 
priority on the road, and joint ticketing schemes.  
⋅ The 2008 Local Transport Act made it easier for operators to work 
together – certain types of collaboration were no longer classified as 
collusion and so no longer attracted significant penalties for breach 
of competition law.  
⋅ In 2010 TfWM (at that time called Centro) began a series of Network 
Reviews to see where and how existing routes could be improved; 
this necessitated joint working and led onto the first partnership, 
Transforming Bus Travel, in 2012.  
⋅ Particularly once the 2008 Local Transport Act came into force, the 
threat (to the operators) of the franchising, of a reregulated system, 
became much greater. The literature indicates that levels of profit are 
lower in a franchised system than a deregulated system (Rye and 
Wretstrand, 2014), so retaining the latter makes sense for private 
operators. 
The partnership has developed more formally through a number of 
partnership documents (TfWM, 2012; 2013, 2014, 2015) – documents 
which, according to at least one interviewee, have decreased in for-
mality and level of detail over time as a shared understanding of what 
the partnership is intended to achieve has developed. More informally, it 
has developed because relationships between staff and levels of trust 
have grown. 
4.4. Outcome 
4.4.1. What has the partnership delivered for different parties? 
The partnership has delivered against its KPIs. After many years of 
decline to a low of 259.3 million trips in 2017/18, the 2018/19 data 
registered an upturn to 267.1 million trips (UK DfT, 2019). Passenger 
satisfaction levels have grown significantly, particularly in relation to 
cleanliness, driver behaviour and personal security (TfWM, 2019). In-
vestment in buses by NEXWM has delivered a newer fleet more quickly 
than at typical rates of renewal. New bus priority schemes such as on 
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Lode Lane in Solihull and Harborne Rd in Birmingham have reduced bus 
journey times on key corridors, as has temporary traffic management in, 
for example, Birmingham City Centre. Fares on NEXWM services have 
been frozen (2016–2020) but new ticketing and payment options have 
at the same time been introduced. Bus services have been introduced to 
serve some new development areas even where in a strictly commercial 
sense they are not viable. Finally the complementary statutory bus 
partnerships in key locations have delivered lower levels of air pollution 
and bus congestion. 
For the public sector partners, then, the partnership has delivered on 
a range of objectives. The tangible benefits to the operator are fewer: 
access to a ticketing brand; an opportunity to influence information 
provision; and, in some cases, new bus priority – although all in-
terviewees highlighted that most Boroughs were lacklustre in delivering 
this latter benefit due to political opposition to roadspace reallocation. 
As one public sector interviewee said: 
“there’s been very little in terms of investment that the local au-
thorities have to put in. So, they come along to the partnership 
meetings and they’ve contributed to the dialogue but in terms of 
what they had to offer, very little”. 
There are however intangible benefits, of which warding off the 
threat of regulation is the biggest – as the bus operator interviewee said: 
When you have 92 per cent of the patronage and 80 per cent of the 
mileage, there is only one way you can go … it basically wipes out a 
third of National Express’ global profits, franchising, so it is a 
problem. So the then focus became - how do we mitigate that po-
litical risk? 
But the partnership also delivers more intangible benefits to the 
operator, such as reduced negative publicity when making changes to 
bus routes. It also helps to build a sense among stakeholders that the bus 
operator is part of the community and working for and with that com-
munity – for example “We take councillors to go and talk to our [bus] 
cleaners at five in the morning. They just love it and they love getting involved 
… and feeling they’ve got a part of the business” (bus operator interviewee). 
In addition, one of the public sector interviewees argued that the part-
nership helped local NEXWM management in particular to secure more 
resources from its global operation: 
So, by having local partnerships and commitments with us it means 
they can then go to their board, their shareholders and say look we 
promised we’re going to deliver these things in the West Midlands so 
you need to give us money to do it. 
In order to achieve its KPIs, the partnership depends on new ways of 
collaborating between organisations previously unused to working 
together and in this sense has delivered new informal institutions, which 
are discussed in the next section. 
4.4.2. In what respects does the partnership work well and in what not so 
well and why? 
As noted above, in terms of KPIs the partnership has delivered. The 
main area of dissatisfaction was the slow pace and scale of bus priority 
implementation by Boroughs; a more minor issue to the bus operator 
interviewee was “Just the speed of doing stuff I suppose. They usually agree 
with me in the end but it takes time. They tend to be quite cumbersome”. 
However, those interviewed tended to compare the way in which the 
partnership works in comparison to what had gone before and so their 
comments were in the main positive. As the interviewee from the Bor-
ough of Solihull commented: 
What was suboptimal in the old arrangement where we didn’t have 
partnerships, by definition we didn’t have that collaboration. So, 
National Express West Midlands … would purely make decisions 
down to commercial imperatives which suited their balance sheet 
and failed to take on board any of our objectives or outcomes that we 
were seeking … 
In contrast, the way of working now, in partnership, where re-
lationships are more informal but at the same time more effective, was 
summed up well by the bus operator interviewee as follows: 
The advantage of the way our relationship works, is that we can go to 
[colleague at Centro, now called TfWM] and go look [colleague at 
Centro], you’ve just - I was just walking down the road talking to one 
of my chaps who says Centro have written in something in Solihull 
that says every bus has to be Euro 6 by 2020. I got an action from that 
conversation to go to Centro and go look, if that’s what you want to 
do we can do it but it’s bonkers because we’ve got a load of Euro 5 
buses that are two years old that won’t be able to service Solihull so 
we may actually end up running less service into - it’s a perverse 
incentive. 
But we can have that conversation or we can go look [colleague at 
Centro] how can we adapt, how can we - what’s the wriggle room. 
What’s the sensible grey area that it delivers the spirit … I don’t 
mean we’re getting out of commitments and we’re polluting the 
streets of Solihull, I mean how do we better deliver that objective in a 
sensible way that doesn’t involve throwing away four-year-old buses 
because you can’t operate them. Or just scrapping service, or cutting 
service, or hiking fares and actually putting more people into their 
cars. There is a sensible middle way and that we can actually have 
that conversation. 
5. The formal institutional case study: attempting to franchise 
buses in North East England 
5.1. Introduction 
In 2011, Nexus (Tyne and Wear Passenger Transport Executive 
(PTE), which reports to the North East Combined Authority (NECA)) was 
one of the first areas to put forward proposals for a Quality Contract 
Scheme (QCS) in the metropolitan region around the city of Newcastle. 
The governance structure for transport in the region is broadly similar to 
the West Midlands although there is no elected Mayor, there are only 
five Borough councils and the population, at around 1.1 million, is much 
smaller; on the other hand, bus ridership per person is much higher, with 
150 million trips in total in 2018. In addition, the local bus market is 
more fragmented than in the West Midlands, with three major operators 
sharing some 97% of the services.) 
5.2. What was the QCS to have consisted of? 
The QCS would have meant that Nexus would take control of the 
entire bus network in the region and plan and then franchise routes, or 
groups of routes, by awarding them on a competitive tendering basis, 
thus ending competition on the road as only one operator would operate 
each contract. The level of public funding would in theory be the same as 
currently put into the deregulated market in the form of support for 
subsidized services, fuel duty rebate and travel by concessionary trav-
elers (those aged 65+) but the funds would have been administered 
differently, in the form of a direct subsidy to operating costs of specific 
contracts. 
It was also intended that Local District Boards for the 5 districts 
would be set up and Nexus would provide to them regular monitoring 
reports on the performance of the network in terms of how many pas-
sengers were being carried, what revenue was being taken, accessibility 
levels, customer complaints, passenger satisfaction etc. 
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5.3. Where did the proposal come from? How did it develop? 
Public sector dissatisfaction with local bus services in the Newcastle 
area dates back to the time of bus deregulation in 1986. The metro-
politan area has an extensive light rail network, the Metro, which was 
built in the 1970s and is still owned, operated and subsidized by Nexus. 
Until deregulation, because Nexus also controlled local bus services, it 
was able to plan a system of feeder bus services to the Metro, and overall 
public transport patronage rose through the 1980s until deregulation 
when private operators withdrew feeder services and instead instituted 
buses that competed with the Metro, and overall patronage fell. This 
dichotomy of privately-owned and operated buses competing with a 
publicly-owned and operated rail-based system was not found in the 
West Midlands, in contrast. 
There were nonetheless quality partnership initiatives taken between 
operators, Nexus and local authorities in the early 2000s. For example, 
the SuperRoute initiative (Confederation of Passenger Transport (n.d.); 
Hensher et al., 2010) brought combined investment in new buses, 
infrastructure and information and ticketing leading to increased 
patronage on certain routes, although by no means all that benefited 
from such investment (Newcastle Evening Chronicle 21/09/2005: Super 
Routes Slipping article). However, apart from a brief interlude in 
2007–2009, this did not stop the overall decline in bus use in the region. 
The TWITA Bus Strategy (2012) noted that, in addition, fares had risen 
faster than inflation for many years and that the decline in patronage 
since 1986 was the greatest of any metropolitan region in the country. 
To this end, the document saw the local bus market as “faced with four 
clear trends: falling patronage; rising fares; increasing reliance on public 
funding which is unsustainable; [and a] contracting network” (TWITA, 
2012 p 24). 
Prior to the publication of the final Bus Strategy, in November 2011, 
the ITA directed Nexus to investigate the possibility of developing a QCS 
across the region as a possible mechanism for achieving the objectives of 
that Bus Strategy. However, it also directed Nexus to work with opera-
tors to consider the potential of a voluntary partnership agreement 
(VPA) as an alternative to the formal QCS, so the preparation of the two 
informal and formal approaches proceeded in parallel over the next 
three years. Both were reported to the North East Combined Authority 
(the successor to the ITA) at its Leadership Board meeting in October 
2014 – the committee report, over 1000 pages long, included a full draft 
of the VPA as well as the QCS. The report noted: 
“The VPA has evolved over the last 18 months: a first proposal was 
put forward by NEBOA (North East Bus Operators Association) in 
October 2012, revised versions were prepared in May 2013 and 
December 2013, and the latest VPA Proposal was provided in May 
2014 … NEBOA have suggested that there has been insufficient 
engagement by Nexus, in fact numerous meetings have been held 
between Combined Authority Officers and NEBOA to jointly develop 
and clarify the VPA Proposal.” 
The draft VPA document, appended to the report, was about 80 pages 
long and written in a very formal, legal style. It gave a very detailed 
financial breakdown of proposed local authority investments but also 
listed major commitments required from operators in terms of fre-
quencies, driver training, vehicle standards and so on. Therefore, while 
this document represented the informal approach, its tone was in fact 
much more “contract” than “partnership” and indeed the draft VPA 
document has “subject to contract” in the header on every page. 
The same report analysed the benefits, costs, strengths and weak-
nesses of the QCS and concluded in its recommendations that the formal 
QCS was more likely than the informal VPA to achieve the objectives of 
the bus strategy. As a Nexus interviewee said: 
We sat down with the bus operators and asked them to develop their 
best quality partnership scheme … We assessed the bus operators’ 
QPS and compared it to the QCS. What we found was that it didn’t 
deliver a lot of the benefits the QCS did. 
The VPA related parts of the report did not discuss what had been 
achieved by earlier partnership working in the region and the fact that 
the VPA (informal) and QCS (formal) proposals were progressed 
concurrently could suggest that the main motivation for the former was 
to act as a counterpoint to the latter. One of the bus operators inter-
viewed for this research said: 
Whilst we sat down with Nexus several times to discuss a partnership 
approach alongside the QCS discussions, there was no intent for Nexus to 
go down that line because they were certain it [the QCS] would come in. 
They would have only considered a partnership if the bus operators had 
agreed to hand over control within the [partnership] area … Personal 
relationships were fine but there was always this feeling that Nexus and 
the politicians believed the bus operators were only in it to make money. 
Another operator simply commented “the relationship between the 
operators and the council [sic] was a problem”. A third said that “on the 
other side, the operators were offering a partnership. We said that if they 
go down this route, it wouldn’t cost them a penny and we could offer them 
all the benefits we believe are in the QCS … [but] we didn’t find them 
willing partners”. 
Certainly in Tyne and Wear the chronology of the informal VPA and 
formal QCS were very different from the West Midlands where a part-
nership has been in place over many years and the QCS or “nuclear op-
tion” (as one interviewee put it), remains only as a background “threat”. 
Additionally, the interview quotes from the operators and Nexus do not 
give a sense of a strong partnership having preceded the development of 
the QCS proposals, at least since the SuperRoute initiative in the early 
2000s. 
5.4. Outcome: Why did the proposal for a QCS not go ahead? 
On 3rd November 2015, the QCS Board (required and constituted by 
law, consisting of the Traffic Commissioner (appointed by the UK 
Department for Transport) and independent consultants, with the power 
to approve a proposed QCS) rejected these proposals and concluded that 
Nexus failed to comply with three out of the five statutory requirements 
for a QCS. In addition, they felt the scheme could not demonstrate that it 
would increase use of bus services, nor that it would have provided value 
for money, and they found that it would have imposed disproportion-
ately adverse effects on operators. Therefore, on the basis of its exami-
nation of the business case provided by Nexus (which was based on its 
consultants’ estimates of the economics of the local bus operation, not 
on any financial data provided by bus operators) the QCS Board decided 
the scheme was unaffordable and the councils would eventually have 
run out of money to keep the buses running. As one bus operator 
interviewed argued, “The cost to the local taxpayer would have been huge 
and for no real benefit”. At that point, therefore, the proposal for a QCS 
ended, and Nexus was forced to pursue alternative means of improving 
bus services in the region – although its bus strategy has not since been 
updated, so there has been no formally-documented move towards more 
partnership working. 
The major reason for the failure of the scheme was clearly that, as 
Nexus did not have the accurate financial information, their costings 
were considered unrealistic. The distance of the public authority from 
the market as a result of three decades of deregulation put them at a 
significant disadvantage in trying to return directly to a publicly 
directed model. As one Nexus interviewee commented: 
Because they had all the data and they run the bus services, they 
know a lot about how the industry works. They are commercially 
minded and had some clever people working against what we wan-
ted to do. 
Another Nexus interviewee highlighted both the novelty of what was 
T. Rye et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Transport Policy 114 (2021) 59–67
65
being tried, and the relative resources of three large bus operators 
compared to the Passenger Transport Executive (PTE) when it came to 
marshalling the arguments for and against the QCS at the Board hearing: 
We were the first to try this and learn all the lessons from it. In many 
respects, the guidance on how to develop a QCS was quite vague. Our 
case in many areas was quite strong and in some areas less strong. In 
our methodology, we made changes along the way and these were 
held against us. They said we were making it up as we went along. 
There were weaker parts of our case and some mistakes made by our 
consultants … We are a small organisation with a small legal team 
and economic advisers. The three bus companies are much bigger … 
with bigger legal teams to take us on. 
As the quote above also indicates, another explanation proffered as 
to why the QCS failed was that of the nature of the legislation in place. 
Most interviewees suggested that the legislation was a barrier and with 
no other QCS successfully implemented in the UK over the past 15 years, 
this suggests that the statutory framework for implementing a QCS is at 
the very least challenging to use. According to Nexus: “There are prob-
ably [other] tools we could have used but we had to stick by legislation and we 
could only deliver what the legislation would let us deliver.” 
6. Analysis and discussion 
In both case studies, the need to take a different approach to bus 
services arose from dissatisfaction with the current situation. In the West 
Midlands, both public authority and operator were dissatisfied in that 
they wanted to realise improvements to services to deliver increases in 
patronage but realized that to do so, more joint working would be 
required than the formal institutional framework facilitated. However, 
the interviews do not indicate that in the West Midlands there was a 
strong sense of the formal framework failing to deliver altogether– 
rather that there was a need to try to work within that system to improve 
it. In Tyne and Wear, dissatisfaction was felt more strongly on the part of 
the public authority: it perceived a failure of the bus system in its region 
to deliver and the cause of this to be the formal institutional framework. 
It therefore looked to change that framework rather than to work within 
it. Hence in one area we observe the gradual development of informal 
institutions to modify the working of the formal institutions, but this is 
not seen in the other area. 
There are of course some aspects specific to the cases that may have 
also influenced the very different approaches observed. In the West 
Midlands, there is only one main operator with a quite stable network 
whereas the bus system in Tyne and Wear, with three main operators, 
has seen more instability and on-road competition. Secondly, there is no 
region-wide publicly owned and operated light rail system in the West 
Midlands with which bus operators may have been perceived to 
compete, whereas in Tyne and Wear, there is. Thirdly, the politics of the 
two regions are different: TfWM has a board with all three main political 
parties represented and, over time, has been in the control of both 
Conservative (more right-leaning) and Labour (more left-leaning) poli-
ticians. Tyne and Wear has been solidly Labour for many years, and 
certainly the bus operators interviewed in the region felt that there were 
ideological motivations for the QCS proposal. 
An important lesson from this study is that the informal and formal 
institutional approaches are clearly not mutually exclusive. In the West 
Midlands, the informal institutional approach(es) that compose the 
voluntary partnership have been introduced to supplement the formal 
institutional framework of the statutory governance and regulatory 
mechanisms that were in place previously, and indeed those that were 
introduced during the period of the partnership (such as the 2017 Bus 
Services Act); and they exist alongside these formal institutions. In 
addition, statutory quality partnerships have been, as noted above, 
introduced in various town centres in the West Midlands to achieve very 
specific air quality, vehicle quality and decongestion objectives in these 
areas, at the same time as the voluntary partnership has been in place. In 
Tyne and Wear, informal institutional approaches (quality partnerships) 
were pursued in the early to mid 2000s, and were proposed as an 
alternative to the statutory quality contract. 
A related issue is whether the use of informal institutional ap-
proaches can make the subsequent use of formal institutions easier. The 
West Midlands now (May 2020) has three statutory partnerships in 
place, with a fourth in consultation. Legally, the Combined Authority 
promotes these, consults officially with the bus operator on them and if 
necessary there is a public hearing to decide if the partnership should go 
ahead – a very formal and potentially adversarial process. However, as 
noted above, the informal partnership has resulted in an open commu-
nicative environment in which proposals for legally binding partner-
ships could be discussed and issues resolved informally at an early stage, 
thus obviating the need for formal adversarial legal proceedings. In the 
Tyne and Wear case, the QCS proposal was not preceded by any large 
scale partnership working that could have facilitated an informal dis-
cussion on that proposal; on the other hand, because the QCS is a 
complete restructuring of the formal institutional framework for buses 
in a region, an informal discussion might not have been that helpful. 
A further issue is what actually constitutes the informal institutions 
in the West Midlands case, and how this contrasts with the Tyne and 
Wear case. One important aspect is clearly the non-statutory partnership 
documents, such as the Bus Alliance document (TfWM, 2015). The main 
document is only 8 pages long and covers 8 key objectives for improving 
bus services – such as reliability, speed, ticketing, security and so on. 
This very short document is accompanied by 50 commitments by the 
different parties as to what will be delivered by whom in terms of 
measures to achieve the objectives. The language and appearance of the 
documents is clear, simple, attractive and certainly not formally 
contractual – they set out instead a shared understanding of what the 
partnership is for and will achieve. A further key aspect of the informal 
institution is the personal relationships and trust underlying the part-
nership which all West Midlands interviewees emphasized – there are, 
clearly, shared rules of the game, and the degree to which these have 
become shared has grown over time. Whilst this is to an extent because 
new more compatible personalities started to work for the operator and 
for the PTA, in the main the shared rules of the game have arisen simply 
because the key parties have agreed to try to work in partnership, and 
consequently gradually become better and better at doing so. In 
contrast, in Tyne and Wear positive relationships between the public 
sector and the bus operators were mentioned by only one interviewee, 
and the draft partnership documentation was drafted in an extremely 
formal, legal manner. There was much less evidence of a willingness to 
try to work together, and thus of the development of shared rules of the 
game. This rather combative situation is further evidenced by the fact 
that the proposals for both the informal VPA and the formal QCS evolved 
over some years as Nexus strove without success to make one or the 
other acceptable to the bus companies. Ultimately it would require a 
legislative change to the formal institution before local authorities 
would have the power to implement the formal approach unilaterally 
(see conclusion). 
There is one improvement to bus services which neither area really 
delivered on a large scale, which was the reallocation of road space to 
bus priority at a region wide scale. This is largely because of the political 
sensitivity of so doing, and may indicate that, partnership or no, this is 
too great a challenge for it to happen on more than an occasional basis. 
This aside, overall the evidence presented in this paper demonstrates 
that the more informal West Midlands approach has delivered more than 
the formal Tyne and Wear approach – but that there are good reasons for 
why this has happened. 
In relation to the agency of the actors involved (Helmke and Levitsky 
(2004), the two cases indeed show very clearly that agents have been 
central to change, through the way they have chosen to engage with 
existing institutional frameworks. In the Tyne and Wear case, a choice 
was made to engage with both the informal (partnership) and formal 
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(QCS) framework in a quite formal way. The partnership proposal was 
brought to the ITA Board at the same time as the QCS proposal, as a 
comparator option in a very formal decision-making process. In contrast, 
in the West Midlands, the informal approach was selected by actors as a 
means to prepare the ground, well in advance, for use of formal in-
stitutions (statutory quality partnerships; and the background “threat” 
of franchising). In addition, a change in the actors involved in bus policy 
and operation in respective institutions in the West Midlands in the early 
2000s was key to the development of partnership working, and several 
interviewees noted that this would not have developed, had other more 
“traditional” actors been involved. 
7. Conclusions 
This paper has sought to understand both how the informal institu-
tional approach can be used effectively, but also to assess its limits; and 
to understand why a formal institutional approach, in spite of its strong 
underlying basis in law, may nonetheless not always function, as well as 
the role of agency in these interactions. 
The context of the bus industries in the two case study regions is 
different, because the West Midlands has one incumbent operator, as 
opposed to the three in Tyne and Wear (although on-road competition is 
now rare in both areas). Nonetheless, there are clear lessons that can be 
drawn about the two institutional approaches and the role of agency. 
The informal institutional approach – partnership – can lead to signifi-
cant change where it benefits from agents who are supportive of that 
approach, and from the background “threat” from the potential regu-
latory body (who itself is one of the agents within the informal institu-
tional approach) of formal change, should the informal institutions fail 
to deliver. This implies that the formal institutional approach is required 
to be available, even though it may not be (fully) used. 
A second key lesson is that the development of effective informal 
institutions can aid the use of formal institutions. In the West Midlands, 
statutory (legally binding) quality partnerships have been introduced in 
several locations to deal with site-specific bus related congestion and 
pollution problems. It is unlikely that these would have been introduced 
as easily, had the informal institutional framework not been already in 
existence such that it developed relationships between agents that were 
much more collaborative and less confrontational than they would have 
been, without the informal framework. It is also possible that the pro-
posal for a QCS in Tyne and Wear would have been judged more 
favourably, if there were more evidence presented by Nexus that they 
had spent many years working within the informal institutional frame-
work of voluntary quality partnerships, achieved some success but 
reached the limits of what the informal approach could deliver. How-
ever, the change from a deregulated privately-owned and operated bus 
service with effective partnerships, to one where the entire region’s bus 
service is regulated and franchised by a public body, is such a significant 
one, with such existential threats to private bus operators, that it is 
unlikely that even a context of successful partnership working such as 
that in the West Midlands could do much to smooth the path of such a 
transition; it would inevitably be quite an adversarial situation. 
There is a third key lesson: that the informal approach has its limits, 
and if there is a desire on the part of a regulatory body such as a PTA to, 
for example, specify (as opposed to influence) service levels and fares 
products in the context of a local bus service, it is highly unlikely that the 
informal approach will allow them to do so fully. However, a regulatory 
body may judge that what it can achieve within the informal institu-
tional framework is a good second best to changing the formal institu-
tional framework because it is much more deliverable and much less 
risky – which is why the majority of PTAs (or equivalents) in Britain 
outside London currently have no immediate plans to use the formal 
institutional approach of re-regulation/franchising (Villa i Aguilar, 
2019). 
Since the time of the case studies examined in this paper, new 
legislation has appeared in the form of the Bus Services Act 2017. This 
new Act continues the trend towards stronger franchising powers by 
simplifying the process compared to earlier legislation. The difference 
between the franchising powers in the new Bus Services Act (2017) and 
the Quality Contract powers in the earlier Local Transport Act (2008), as 
used by Nexus in the formal case study in this paper, is that the 
requirement to submit an application to the QCS Board (or similar) has 
been removed. Under the new legislation, the authority’s proposals for 
franchising only require to be independently audited before being sub-
mitted to the Secretary of State. 
The new Act also contains an emphasis on providing these powers to 
the new combined regional authorities with directly elected mayors. The 
ability to create these regional authorities was legislated for in the 
Localism Act 2011, although it is left to the discretion of the constituent 
municipalities within each region as to whether or not they wish to form 
a combined authority, as well as what form it should take and what 
powers it would have. If these new authorities decide to apply the bus 
franchising powers from the Bus Services Act 2017 in their jurisdictions 
would be likely to bring their bus systems even closer to the London 
model than if they had applied a QCS (White, 2010), although the 
combined authorities will have less funding for subsidising bus services 
than their London equivalent, Transport for London. However, a topic 
worthy of further research such as that carried out by Villa i Aguilar 
(2019) is related to the likelihood that, after several changes throughout 
the years, these optional powers will in fact finally be used. 
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Annex 1. Outline Interview Guide  
1. Feel free to tell us a little about your background and work, and 
how long you have been working on the QP/QC.  
2. How would you describe the QP/QC?  
3. What was it about the previous situation (without the QP/QC) 
that was sub-optimal?  
4. What is the goal of the QP/QC (more travelers, reduced costs, 
increased customer satisfaction, etc.)?  
5. Who was most dissatisfied with the previous situation, of the 
various actors involved? Why?  
6. Where did the idea of the QP/QC come from? Was it the result of 
a search by certain “policy entrepreneurial” figures, or was it 
simply a copy of what was perceived to have worked well 
elsewhere?  
7. Who (which actors) is involved in the QP/QC (initiative) and 
what do they contribute? How does this differ from the previous 
situation? Are there conflicts of interest between organisations? 
How are conflicts handled?  
8. Do the concepts of "partnership" and "quality" in the QP signal 
changes (eg in goals, roles and forms of cooperation between 
organisations)?  
9. Has the QP/QC (initiative) changed organizational roles and 
competencies? If so, how have some organisations reacted to 
this? 
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10. What "qualities" enable an effective partnership between orga-
nisations in the QP?  
11. What organisation/routines/processes/arenas for collaboration 
between organisations exist in the QP or QC context, if at all?  
12. Which factors have affected the implementation process?  
13. Has the QP/QC (initiative) been as successful as was hoped in 
delivering improved public transport? Why, why not?  
14. What results do you think the QP has had? Are there measurable 
results on customer satisfaction, travel development, efficiency 
and profitability, etc.?  
15. Anything else or anyone else important that we should have 
talked about? 
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González, S., Healey, P., 2005. A sociological institutionalist approach to the study of 
innovation in governance capacity. Urban Stud. 42 (11), 2055–2069. 
Gwilliam, K., 2008. Bus transport: is there a regulatory cycle? Transport. Res. Pol. Pract. 
42 (9), 1183–1194. 
Hansson, L., 2013. Hybrid steering cultures in the governance of public transport: a 
successful way to meet demands? Res. Transport. Econ. 39 (1), 175–184. 
Helmke, G., Levitsky, S., 2004. Informal institutions and comparative politics. Perspect. 
Polit. 2 (4), 725–740. 
Hensher, D., Stanley, J., 2010. Contracting regimes for bus services. What have we learnt 
after 20 years? Res. Transport. Econ. 29, 140–144. 
Hensher, D.A., Mulley, C., Yahya, N., 2010. Passenger experience with quality-enhanced 
bus service: the tyne and wear ‘superroute’ services. Transportation 37 (2), 239–256. 
Hirschhorn, F., van de Velde, D., Veeneman, W., ten Heuvelhof, E., 2020. The 
Governance of Attractive Public Transport: Informal Institutions, Institutional 
Entrepreneurs, and Problem-Solving Know-How in Oslo and Amsterdam. Research in 
Transportation Economics (in press).  
Holmgren, J., 2020. The effect of public transport quality on car ownership–A source of 
wider benefits? Res. Transport. Econ. 83, 100957. 
Hrelja, R., 2015. Integrating transport and land-use planning? How steering cultures in 
local authorities affect implementation of integrated public transport and land use 
planning. Transport. Res. Pol. Pract. 74, 1–13. 
Hrelja, R., Monios, J., Rye, T., Isaksson, K., Scholten, C., 2017. The interplay of formal 
and informal institutions between local and regional authorities when creating well- 
functioning public transport systems. International Journal of Sustainable 
Transportation 11 (8), 611–622. 
Hrelja, R., Rye, T., Mullen, C., 2018. Partnerships between operators and public transport 
authorities. Working practices in relational contracting and collaborative 
partnerships. Transport. Res. Pol. Pract. 116, 327–338. 
i Aguilar, Villa, 2019. Bus Franchising in Great Britain. Unpublished MSc Thesis, 
Edinburgh Napier University. 
Jessop, B., 2001. Institutional (re)turns and the strategic-relational approach. Environ. 
Plann. 33 (7), 1213–1235. 
McTigue, C., Rye, T., Monios, J., 2020. Identifying barriers to implementation of local 
transport policy – lessons learned from case studies on bus policy implementation in 
Great Britain. Transport Pol. 91, 16–25. 
Meyer, J.W., Rowan, B., 1977. Institutionalized organizations: formal structure as myth 
and ceremony. Am. J. Sociol. 83 (2), 340–363. 
North, D.C., 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.  
North, D.C., 1991. Institutions. J. Econ. Perspect. 5 (No. 1), 97–112. Winter, 1991, 
Published by: American Economic Association Stable.  
Preston, J., Almutairi, T., 2013. Evaluating the long term impacts of transport policy: an 
initial assessment of bus deregulation. Res. Transport. Econ. 39 (1), 208–214. 
Rye, T., Wretstrand, A., 2014. Converging structures? Recent regulatory change in bus- 
based local public transport in Sweden and England. Res. Transport. Econ. 48, 
24–32. 
Scott, W.R., 2008. Institutions & Organizations, third ed. Sage, Los Angeles.  
Selznick, P., 1996. Institutionalism “old” and “new”. Adm. Sci. Q. 41 (2), 270–277. 
Stanley, J., Hensher, D.A., 2008. Delivering trusting partnerships for route bus services: a 
Melbourne case study. Transport. Res. Pol. Pract. 42 (10), 1295–1301. 
Stanley, J., van de Velde, D., 2008. Risk and reward in public transport contracting. Res. 
Transport. Econ. 22, 20–25. 
TfWM (2012) Summary of Bus Network Reviews. Published by TfWM, Birmingham, UK. 
TfWM (2013) Bus Quality Partnership Document. Published in 2013 by TfWM, 
Birmingham, UK. 
TfWM (2014) Bus Quality Partnership Update Report. Published in 2014 by TfWM, 
Birmingham, UK. 
TfWM, 2015. Bus Alliance Document. Published in 2015 by. publisher TfWM, 
Birmingham, UK.  
TfWM (2019) Annual Report 2018. Published in 2019 by TfWM, Birmingham, UK. 
Transport for Greater Manchester (TfGM), 2018. Greater Manchester Transport Strategy 
2040. https://tfgm.com/2040-transport-strategy. (Accessed 2 June 2021). accessed.  
Transport Scotland, 2019. Scottish Transport Statistics No. 38 2019 Edition. Transport 
Scotland, UK.  
Urban Transport Group (UTG), 2016. The Case for the Urban Bus - the economic and 
social benefits of investing in the urban bus. Published by UTG, Leeds, UK.  
Van de Velde, D., 2003. Regulation and competition in the European land transport 
industry: some recent evolutions. In: Thredbo 8 conference, Rio de Janeiro. 
September 2003. 
Welsh Government, 2019. Public Service Vehicles in Wales, 2017-18. Welsh 
Government, UK.  
White, P.R., 2010. The conflict between competition policy and the wider role of the 
local bus industry in Britain. Res. Transport. Econ. 29 (1), 152–158. 
T. Rye et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
